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EARNINGSCOVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
UNDER most systems of security selection, including those based
on the quality measures discussed in preceding chapters, atten-
tion is given either directly or indirectly to earnings coverage and
to the nature of the lien on assets. The emphasis given these two
factors in actual investment operations depends to a considerable
extent upon the objectives of the investor, as well as upon his
abilities. At the present time most security analysts (using that
term in the sense in which it is customarily employed in large in-
vestment institutions) concern themselves primarily with the first
of these two elements, or more specifically, with the problem of
inferring default risk from data on past earnings, etc. Legal invest-
ment advisors in the larger investment institutions are concerned
primarily with the second element: with the protection afforded
by assets, or more narrowly, with the nature of the lien on assets,
which becomes highly important after a default occurs. The two
facets of the investment problem cannot be completely separated
in practice, since primacy of the lien on assets frequently implies
primacy of the claim on earnings, and vice versa. Nevertheless,
the emphasis given them does differ under different investment
programs. It is the purpose of this chapter to weigh the relative
merits of these two approaches to investment safety, in so far as
this may be done with data on past experience.
Since for outstanding issues the basic records on which this
investigation rests contain no information on earnings coverage
and lien position, the analysis is perforce limited to an appraisal
of the performance of bond issues in the different categories at
offering. It will appear from what follows that the coverage of the
data on lien position at offering is excellent. Because of difficulties
encountered in obtaining suitable income statements at offering,
the coverage of the data on earnings is less complete, particularly
for the early part of the century.
Subject to such limitations, the analysis will be developed
along the lines of preceding chapters. After a brief summary of
findings, two main sections follow, the first pertaining to earnings
coverage as measured by the times-charges-earned ratio and by390 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
the ratio of net income to gross income; and the second, to the
lien position of the issue at offering, as determined by the type of
security (secured or unsecured) and by rank of issue (i.e. whether
the lien on assets was senior, intermediate, or junior to other
issues). At the beginning of each principal section, the variables
under consideration are defined and the limitations of the data
are indicated. Thereafter follow a discussion of the percentage
distributions of bond offerings by the respective variables, and an
analysis of default rates and of average yields and loss rates on
defaulted and nondefaulted issues.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Earnings tests are regularly used by investors, rating agencies,
regulatory authorities, and others as a means of ranking bond
issues in order of exposure to the risk of default. The lien position
of bond issues is also given careful consideration in an effort to
protect the principal invested against the large losses that might
otherwise occur in the event of a default. Despite important reser-
vations to be brought out later in the chapter, our findings gen-
erally confirm the emphasis given to these two aspects of invest-
ment quality. Issues that had adequate earnings protection at
offering usually went into default less frequently than those that
did not have such coverage. Similarly, issues that had adequate
asset protection at offering usually fared better in default situa-
tions than issues that were unsecured.
Data on the times-charges-earned ratio show a pronounced
improvement in interest coverage on total bond offerings between
1900 and 1943, but on closer examination this is found to be
largely a statistical mirage, since neither rails nor industrials
showed any systematic movement although utilities had a sligh.t
upward trend. Financial information needed to compute the earn-
ings ratios was more complete for railroads than other industries
in the early part of the century, but rail bonds had the lowest
times-charges-earned ratios at offering. Conversely, less financial
information was available for the utilities and industrials in the
early years, but those industries had the highest interest coverage
at offering. The all-industries averages of the computed times-
charges-earned ratios drifted upward as rail bonds declined in
importance in total bond offerings, and as more information
became available for utilities and industrials. Industry differences
in "margins of safety" (ratios of net income to gross income) wereEARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION 391
less pronounced, rails and industrials having similar ratios but
lower than public utilities. The all-industries figures for the
average margin of safety at offering therefore showed no pro-
nounced trend.
More significant patterns are to be observed in the behavior of
the earnings ratios over the shorter periods spanned by business
cycles. Generally speaking, the average times-charges-earned ratio
for bond offerings and the average ratio of net income to gross
both reveal a moderate inverse conformity to general business
cycles. Earnings coverage on bond offerings, calculated on the
basis of average earnings over the five years preceding the offering,
typically declined during early business expansions and rose dur-
ing business contractions, thus providing additional evidence of
the existence of a perverse credit cycle in the bond market. Two
explanations for this phenomenon come to mind. One is that
some investors (perhaps influenced by the upgrading and down-
grading of outstanding issues by the investment rating agencies)
may have been swayed more by current earnings than by long-run
average earnings, in effect making it more difficult for marginal
borrowers to obtain capital funds when business was contracting
than when it was expanding. An alternative explanation is that
during the period studied the better credit risks relied more on
the bond market in times of stress, and on the stock market and
other sources of capital funds in business expansions. While no
attempt has been made to determine whether either or both of
these explanations are correct, some support for the latter is pro-
vided by the fact that the total volume of funds flowing through
the bond market from lenders to borrowers was inverted with
respect to the general business cycle; that is, more funds were sup-
plied on balance in business contractions than in expansions. This
point and the relationship between bond and stock financing is
discussed in Volume of Financing, pages 154—179.
The default record of corporate bond offerings classified by the
two earnings ratios accords precisely with what has been intended
in their use by investors. The times-charges-earned ratio and the
margin of safety, whether considered individually or jointly, had
a systematic bearing on the incidence of default. With great regu-
larity, the larger the average number of times fixed charges were
earned over the five years preceding offering, and the higher the
ratio of net income to gross income, the greater was the protection
afforded by future earnings, and the lower was the rate of default,892 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
a finding that appears particularly striking in view of the long
periods that may elapse between offering and extinguishment, and
the myriads of events that may intervene to alter an obligor's
ability to withstand a default.
The earnings ratios also behaved as expected for bond issues
that went into default. The ratios are used by investors at offering
to avoid defaults, and show no close relationship to the price and
yield experience of the particular group of bond issues that hap-
pened to go into default. For the aggregate of all issues (defaults
plus nondefaults), however, we again observe significant results.
The earnings ratios are types of rating systems akin to those ex-
amined in preceding chapters, and show corresponding patterns
of behavior among the bond issues rated. Here again the top grade
issues generally had the lowest promised yields at offering, the
lowest life-span yields realized from offering to extinguishment,
and the lowest capital loss rates (or highest rates of capital gain).
Conversely, the bottom grades had the highest promised yields
and loss rates, and also the highest realized rates of return.
The relationship between lien position and corporate bond
experience is roughly the reverse of that of earnings coverage,
although industry differences were more important and frequently
obscured the effects of the lien on the all-industries behavior. The
"secured" issues (those backed by mortgage, collateral, or lease-
hold) were most important in the railroad field, and were least
important in the industrial. Although the railroads rarely offered
pure first mortgage bonds, they relied more heavily than other
corporations upon secured issues ranking intermediate or junior
to other issues. Contrariwise, the industrial group offered a larger
proportion of unsecured issues (debentures) than other corpora-
tions; but so few were preceded by prior liens that industrials
had the highest proportion of offerings ranking senior to or
coequal with other issues.
Largely because of the growth of unsecured financing for in-
dustrial corporations during the period analyzed and the declining
importance of the rails, there was a long-term downward drift in
the proportion of secured offerings in the par-amount total of all
offerings. Over business cycles, the secured offerings of the rail-
roads conformed inversely, while the unsecured offerings con-
formed positively. Although the other industries exhibited posi-
tive or negligible conformity to the business cycle, the rails
accounted for a sufficiently large proportion of secured offeringsEARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION 393
to dominate the all-industries totals, which therefore conformed
inversely. There is thus again some evidence of a perverse credit
cycle in bond financing, the railroads offering larger proportions
of secured offerings in business contractions than in business ex-
pansions. A possible explanation isthat investors were more
confident of the long-term outlook for railroad investments in
good times than in bad, and took rail debentures only during
business expansions.
The lien position of a bond issue may determine the position
of the bondholders' claim on assets (and earnings) in the event
of a default, but has little direct bearing on the degree of exposure
to default risk at offering. Such differences as were observed in the
default rates of bond issues classified by lien position at offering
were related primarily to the types of issues customarily used by
the different obligor groups and to the credit-worthiness of the
principal issuers. In most periods unsecured issues could be floated
only by corporations with a high credit standing, and such offer-
ings had an excellent record with respect to subsequent default;
but in periods when debentures were used by marginal concerns
(e.g. in the 1920's when they were successfully floated by the pyra-
mided public utility holding companies), unsecured offerings
proved extremely liable to default. There is nothing in the records
to indicate that lien position at offering had a significant effect on
the incidence of default, when considered independently of the
industry of the obligor, earnings coverage, and various other
factors bearing upon the ability of the obligor to service funded
debt.
A quite different situation obtained with respect to the price
and yield experience of issues in the different lien position classes
that happened to go into default. Almost without exception
among the groups studied, unsecured issues had poorer records
than secured issues as to cash payments after default, and had
poorer life-span yield experience. From the evidence, secured
issues generally fared better than unsecured issues in corporate
reorganizations.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the over-all yield experi-
ence on secured as against unsecured issues in the different indus-
try groups was largely governed by two factors: the relative fre-
quency of defaults on the two types of issues; and the differential
yield experience on issues that went into default. The net effect
of these factors was that for large issues in the several industry394 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LiEN POSITION
groups realized yields were higher on secured issues while for
small issues they were higher on debentures.
To summarize, the yield experience on defaulted issues was
generally in favor of the secured issues, but the degree of exposure
to default risk was largely governed by other factors. The records
show that adequate coverage as to earnings over a reasonable
period preceding offering resulted in a low rate of subsequent
default and that adequate security as to assets resulted in favored
treatment after default.
EARNINGS COVERAGE
By all odds the most popular measure of earnings coverage is the
times-charges-earned ratio, or the number of times that interest
charges were earned by the obligor over some specified period pre-
ceding the offering (see, for example, pages 220 f., 224 F., and 229 f.
for the use made of such ratios in the statutes defining the lists of
securities eligible for savings bank investment in the different
states; times-charges-earned ratios are also used by state insurance
commissioners to determine whether or not securities are legal for
investment by life insurance companies and are amortizable after
purchase).1 In addition to the times-charges-earned ratio, a num-
ber of other financial ratios are employed by security analysts,
among the most important of which is the net profit margin, or
so-called margin of safety, defined as the ratio of the net income
of the obligor after fixed charges and taxes to the gross income
from ordinary business operations.2 These two ratios are examined
in the present section for the light that they throw on the risk of
default and on the yields obtained by investors who purchase
corporate bonds at offering.
Nature of the Data
Times-charges-earned ratios such as are published in the invest-
ment manuals or used in drawing up the various legal lists are
1 Final Report to Insurance Companies, Societies, and Associations (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 1953), pp. vii f.; also Section 81 of
the Insurance Law of New York (Chapter 28 of the Consolidated Laws).
2 The term "margin of safety" corresponds to Moody's usage in its manuals
after 1942. It should not be confused with Moody's usage before 192g. which
referred to the ratio of net income after fixed charges to net income before
charges. (The earlier usage is redundant, since the margin of safety is then a
simple function of the times-charges-earned ratio, viz., one minus the reciprocal
of that ratio.)EARNINGS 395
often calculated by relating past earnings to past fixed charges
(i.e. fixed charges excluding those reflecting new financing). In
purchasing bonds at offering, however, the ratio is used to infer
the protection afforded future fixed charges by earnings. For that
purpose, it is usual to calculate the times-charges-earned ratio on
a pro forma basis by estimating future fixed charges from the
capital of the obligor after giving full effect to interest
charges resulting from the new financing.
The estimation of future fixed charges is, of course, the only
practical procedure for an investor contemplating the purchase
of an issue at offering. For purposes of the present investigation,
however, the more economical and accurate procedure was to
relate actual fixed charges in the 'year following the offering to the
average of earnings available for such charges over a specified
period preceding the offering, thus avoiding the necessity for
estimating pro forma charges. To reduce the effects of business
cycles, earnings were averaged over the five-year period next pre-
ceding the offering.3 The times-charges-earned ratio was computed
only when earnings statements were available for the full five
years preceding offering and for the year following offering; other-
wise, the ratio was coded as "information lacking."
The numerator used in calculating the times-charges-earned
ratios is the gross income of the obligor from all sources less all
expenses and taxes (including federal income taxes), but before
the deduction of fixed charges. As a practical matter, earnings
available for fixed charges were most readily computed from the
abbreviated financial statements published in the early part of
the century by adding the fixed charges to the net income avail-
able for distribution to stockholders (common and preferred divi-
dends plus retained earnings). Since income taxes are computed
on the basis of income after charges and other taxes, only taxes
other than federal income taxes are normally deducted to de-
termine the amount available for fixed charges. In the present
investigation, however, it was frequently not possible to obtain
an adequate breakdown of taxes by type, so that for consistency
of treatment all taxes were lumped together and deducted from
3Inmost cases, the practice of relating earnings over a five-year period
preceding offering to fixed charges of the year following offering introduced a
gap of one year between the last financial statement before and the first state-
ment after the offering. An exception occurred when an issue was extended on
the last day of a fiscal period (extended issues, it will be recalled, are treated
as new offerings in this investigation).396 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
net income. This procedure gives our ratios a conservative bias
in that they underestimate the measure of protection afforded by
earnings. (On similar reasoning, many security analysts calculate
the ratio both before and after federal income taxes.) Except in
wartime, however, federal income taxes were relatively light dur-
ing the period studied. It has been estimated that the "effective
tax rate" (country-wide federal corporate income tax liabilities
as reported in Statistics of Income divided by compiled net cor-
porate profits) was under 2 percent up to 1916, rose to 20 percent
in 1917 and to just under 40 percent in 1918, dropped to a range
between 11 and 18 percent in 1921—39, and rose again to just
under 60 percent in Except in war years, therefore, the
conservative bias resulting from our treatment of taxes should
not be exceptionally large.
"Fixed charges," as used in the denominator of the times-
charges-earned ratio, include interest charges of any nature,
whether on funded or unfunded debt; net rentals incurred for
leased lines, terminal facilities, buildings, or equipment; and
amortization of debt discount and preferred dividends of sub-
sidiaries. In calculating fixed charges, net rental credits were dis-
regarded, as were contingent charges such as interest on income
bonds.
The "margin of safety" used in this investigation is the ratio
of the net income available for distribution to stockholders (divi-
dends plus retained earnings) to the gross income received from
sale of products or services normal to the business operation, and
before any deduction for expenses or charges. Gross income is the
"Total Operating Revenue" of railroads and public utilities and
the "Net Sales," "Total Sales," or "Total Receipts" of industrial
enterprises. In calculating the ratio, nonoperating income was
excluded from gross income but its contribution was included in
net income. Both net and gross income were averaged over the
five full years preceding the date of offering, and the ratio was
not calculated unless financial statements for all of those years
were available. On an assumption that costs and nonoperating in-
come are completely rigid, the margin of safety would represent
the maximum proportion by which total sales might shrink and
fixed charges still be earned in full. The margin of safety or net
4Theeffective tax rates are from Sergei P. Dobrovolsky's Corporate Income
Taxation in the United States, 1909-1950 (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, ms.), Chapter 1 and Chart 1.EARNiNGS COVERAGE 397
profit margin is regarded by many investment analysts as a more
conservative and sensitive measure of earnings protection than
the times-charges-earned ratio, particularly for highly cyclical in-
dus tries.
Under the procedures followed in this investigation, the two
earnings ratios were deliberately not calculated in certain cases.
Income statements for years preceding a reorganization or merger
were used only if they reflected earnings from substantially the
same assets as were owned by the new or reorganized company.
Earnings ratios were not computed for guaranteed issues nor for
issues of companies obtaining the major portion of their income
from rentals, since earnings statements in such cases usually do
not reflect the true earning power behind the obligations. The
ratios were also not computed for railroads when any of the
requisite income statements fell within the period of federal gov-
ernment operation (July 1918 to September 1920), since the rail-
roads were then in the position of lessors receiving guaranteed
annual rentals equal to their average operating income over a
prewar base period.5 Since earnings statements were required for
the full five years preceding offering for both earnings ratios, and
for the year following offering for the times-charges-earned ratio,
the exclusion of the period of federal operation means that the
ratio of net income to gross income was not calculated for railroad
bonds offered in the years 1919—25, and that the times-charges-
earned ratio was not calculated for the years 1917—25; however,
the ratios were calculated in those years for industries providing
services incidental to railroads (and included in our railroad
group) and for the other major industry groups.
In accordance with the practice followed throughout the in-
vestigation, consolidated income statements of the obligor and its
subsidiaries were used rather than those covering the obligor and
its parent, on the assumption that such statements best reflect the
tru.e earning power behind the obligation.6 Pro forma statements
were not used, and ICC statements were used only when company
statements were not available.
5Cf.Walker D. Hines, War History of American Railroads (New Haven,
1928), pp. 94f.
6Ourpractice in this respect closely follows the present provisions of Section
81 of the Insurance Law of New York defining legal investments of life in-
surance companies.398 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
Times-Charges-Earned Ratios and I
Marginsof Safety at Offering
Percentage distributions of the par-amount totals of bonds offered
in quadrennial periods, 1900—1943, by the times-charges-earned
ratio and ratio of net income to gross income, are presented in
Tables 81 and 82. Because of the sparsity of financial data on
earnings coverage in the early part of the century and the strin-
gent conditions under which the ratios were computed, the
coverage of the tables is more fragmentary than that of others
presented in this report, and the data would be especially difficult
to interpret unless adjusted to exclude issues for which no infor-
mation was available. For that reason we have departed from our
usual practice of presenting the original unadjusted figures (with
a special category for the information-lacking items) and have
based the tables on only those offerings for which the earnings
ratios were computed. Coverage is indicated by the two right-hand
columns of the tables, which give the par amounts included in the
preceding columns and. show their percentage ratio to total offer-
ings. The adjusted distributions may, of course, be multiplied
through by the indicated coverage to obtain the original distri-
butions.
A pronounced improvement in coverage between 1900 and
1943 is evident, reflecting the larger volume of reliable financial
information available for the latter part of the period. Thus the
times-charges-earned ratio could be computed for only 11 percent
of the par amount of bonds offered in the first of the quadrennial
periods (1900—1903), as compared with 90 percent in the last
period (1940—43). The coverage of the distributions of offerings
by net income as a percentage of gross income was approximately
the same as for times-charges-earned and exhibits the same secular
improvement.
In the early part of the century the coverage was considerably
better for railroads than for the other two major industry groups.
In fact, beginning in 1908 the rail coverage was always better than
60 except for the three quadrennial periods affected by
federal operation (1916—19, 1920—23, and 1924—27). It will be ob-
served that the coverage improved markedly for utilities and in-
dustrials in later years, so that from 1932 onward the utilities had

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3402 EARNiNGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
As Table 81 indicates, fixed charges were usually earned a
smaller number of times at offering by rails than by utilities, and
by utilities than by industrials. On the average over the full
period studied, rails earned their charges about one and one-half
times at offering, utilities just over twice, and industrials over
three and one-half times. The average ratios reflect in part the
heavy indebtedness of the rails and utilities, and the compara-
tively light indebtedness of the industrials. The lower ratios for
bonds offered by the two regulated industry groups also reflect
the faith of investors at the time of offering in the cyclical sta-
bility of their earnings.
The strength of public utility bonds in the past arose from the
fact that they were obligations of a rapidly growing industry, and
that utility earnings fluctuated narrowly about a rising trend (in
contrast with the rails, where n.either of these conditions was met
during most of the period studied). The utilities have also had
unusually high ratios of net income to gross income (20 percent
on the average at offering), which meant that they were able to
carry a large proportion of their gross revenues through to net
earnings (Table 82). An additional element of strength is that
depreciation charges have usually been fairly heavy for the utili-
ties. The two factors combined (heavy depreciation charges and a
high ratio of net income to gross income) meant that the gross
revenues of the utilities could decline by substantial amounts and
still leave adequate cash throw-offs from operations to cover fixed
charges. It is thus not surprising that the utilities had the best
record with respect to defaults of any of the major industry
groups, despite their heavy fixed charges. (For the annual default
record of the major industries, see Chapter 2 of this report; also
Volume of Table A—17.)
The records indicate that the rails and industrials stood about
even when compared on the basis of ratios of net income to gross
income at offering. Obligors in these two industries typically had
only half as large margins of safety as the public utilities, so that
many of them ran out of cash quickly during business contrac-
tions and defaulted on their obligations. On the other hand, since
industrial fixed charges were light in relation to earnings, and
industrial earnings recovered rapidly during business expansions,
industrial defaults were usually remedied quickly. The rails, with
heavier fixed charges and a slower rate of growth, were less fortu-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































indefault over extended periods. (On the speed of default settle-
ments for major industry groups, see Volume of Financing, pp.
210—14.)
Tables 81 and 82 reveal several additional points of interest
pertaining to the behavior of the financial ratios for offerings.
One is that earnings coverage as measured by the times-charges-
earned ratio rose rather consistently in the all-industries totals
over the period studied, the average ratio rising from 1.3 in 1900—
1903 to 3.3 in 1940—43. (This also appears clearly in Chart 28,
which shows weighted averages of the ratios calculated annually
for borrowing corporations.) Analysis of the data for the major
industry groups shows that the upward trend was found only in
the public utilities, the industrials fluctuating violently but neither
rails nor industrials showing any apparent trend. The ratios were
usually lower for rails than for the other industries, and the
gradual decline in the importance of rails in total bond offerings
and the improved coverage of the data for utilities and industrials
combined to raise the fixed charge ratios for the all-industries
totals.
A quirk of the data is that a comparable improvement does not
appear in the ratios of net income to gross income at offering
(Table 82, and the lower panel of Chart 28). Thus the average
ratio for all industries combined was identical (13 percent) for the
initial and terminal periods of Table 82, although sharp fluctua-
tions occurred in the interim years. The margin of safety was
fairly stable for public utilities over the full period 1900—1943,
but drifted downward for industrials. It was definitely lower for
the railroads after they were returned to private management at
the end of World War I.
Notesto Chart 28.
Mean ratios weighted by par amounts, from Tables 79 and 82 of "Statistical Meas-
ures" covering allstraight corporate issues for which informaflon was av&Iable
(see Tables 81 and 82 herein). In the times-charges-earned ratio, average annual in-
come (after taxes but before charges) over the five-year period preceding offering
date was related to the fixed charges for the first full year following offering. In
the ratio of net income to gross income, both net and gross were averaged over
the five years preceding offering date. Since ratios were not computed for railroad
issues during the period of federal operation, the all-industries lines exclude 1917-25
for the times-charges-earned ratio and 1919.25 for the ratio of net income to gross
income (see text section on nature of the data).
Shaded areas, representing contractionsin general business activity, and white
areas, representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's
"Measuring Business Cycles" (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 78.408 EARNiNGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
Earnings Ratios and Business Cycles
A further point of interest is the possible effect of the business
cycle on the financial ratios near the date of offering. The quad-
rennial distributions of offerings are clearly inadequate for analyz-
ing it, but so far as they go, seem to suggest rather low conformity
to business cycles. No systematic relationship, for example, can
be detected between changes over the quadrennial periods in the
proportions of offerings with high or low financial ratios and
changes over the corresponding periods in the indexes of business
activity presented in Table 7. It is not entirely clear, a priori,
whether or not a close correspondence should be expected be-
tween the financial ratios we have used and business cycles. For
most corporations, and for the universe of all corporations, cur-
rent earnings ratios improve in good times and deteriorate in bad;
but our statistics cover only borrowing corporations, and their
ratios need not follow that pattern if rigid standards of inherent
investment quality are imposed by lenders on borrowers. More-
over, our ratios are not based on current earnings of business
corporations but on past earnings. The numerator of the times-
charges-earned ratio and both the numerator and the denomi-
nator of the ratio of net to gross income are averages of earnings
over the five years preceding the year of offering. Tests indicate
that for all corporations such ratios have a smaller amplitude of
cyclical variation than corresponding ratios based on current earn-
ings, and negligible conformity to business cycles.7 Our earnings
ratios may, as a matter of fact, be looked upon as measures of in-
herent quality, akin to agency ratings and legal status, and are
frequently used precisely as such by professional investors when
selecting corporate bonds at offering.8 It is therefore of interest
TRatiosof net to gross income, but not the times-charges.earned ratios,
can be computed from Statistics of Income data covering all reporting corpora-
tions. When based on current earnings, the ratios are highly correlated with
business cycles (conformity indexes +60, + 100, +80). Ratios of five.year mov-
ing averages of net to gross income, postdated one year after the latest year
included, from Statistics of Income—which represent universe estimates corre-
sponding to weighted averages of our ratios for borrowing corporations—show
negligible conformity (conformity indexes —100, 0, —14; the high negative in-
dex for expansions reflects a downward trend of the ratio of net to gross in-
come for the corporate universe over the period studied, and has no cyclical
significance). It should be noted in passing that our ratios are not based on
moving averages, but are weighted averages of past earnings for the particular
corporations that happened to borrow in the respective years.
8As a matter of fact, they are so used in the laws governing investmentEARNINGS COVERAGE 409
to observe bow these measures behaved over business cycles; for
it is at least conceivable that some investors may have raised or
lowered the standards applied to borrowers, even though the
intrinsic quality of the corporate universe may have undergone
little cyclical change.
To explore this matter, special annual series were constructed
showing the weighted average number of times that fixed charges
were earned before offering (with par amounts of offerings as
weights) and the corresponding averages based on net income as
a percent of gross income. Since information on the major indus-
try groups was sketchy for certain of the early years, the utilities
and industrials have been combined in Chart 28 (after appropri-
ate par-amount weighting). Since little information was available
for the rails for years in which they were affected by federal opera-
tion, they have been omitted from the chart, as well as from the
all-industries figures for that period. When constructing con-
formity indexes for these series, business cycles for which little or
no information was available were ignored (see note to Table 83).
The graph of the times-charges-earned ratios for borrowing
corporations indicates a rather low, but nevertheless perceptible,
inverse conformity to business cycles, a fact that is substantiated
by the generally negative signs of the conformity indexes in
Table 83. Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for
nonborrowing corporations (nor for the universe of all corpora-
tions), so that not too much emphasis should be placed on these
results. The inverted patterns of conformity are not pronounced
and only the full-cycle index for industrials is so high as to indi-
cate significant inverse conformity. (The positive expansion index
for all industries reflects the upward drift of the times-charges-
earned ratio in our sample and has no cyclical significance.) More-
over, an analysis of the timing of the turning points of the indi-
vidual series relative to those of the general business cycle failed
to reveal a systematic pattern of leads or lags for the rails and
utilities. Industrials were found to be coincident with the business
cycle, the series typically falling from business trough to peak and
rising from peak to trough. We conclude that some slight evi-
dence of a perverse credit cycle may be detected in the times-
charges-earned ratios of industrial borrowers, with a tendency for
eligibility for various financial institutions; see the opening paragraph under
Coverage," above.410 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
investors to accept offerings with lower average earnings coverage
as business expanded, and to require higher average coverage as
business contracted.
TABLE 83—Conformity Indexes for Times-Charges-Earned
Ratio and Ratio of Net Income to Gross Income for
Bonds Offered 1900—1943
Expansion Contraction Full Cycle
Times- Charges-Earned Ratio
All industries +62 —14 —8
Public utilities and
industrials 0 —20 —26
Railroads —25 —14 —8
Public utilities —20 —20 —16
Industrials —25 —25 —60
All industries
Ratio of Net Income to Gross Income
0 —14 —8
Public utilities and
industrials 0 0 —26
Railroads 0 +14 +8
Public utilities —30 0 —26
Industrials —25 —25 —33
Based on average ratios of the annual par-amount data for straight corporate
bonds in Statistical Measures, Tables 79 and 82; these indexes do not take
account of possible leads or lags at reference-cycle turning points. Since
ratios were not computed for railroad issues when the requisite earnings
statements reflected years of federal operation (1918—20), the indexes for
railroads and for all industries cover seven complete and one partial expansion
(for times-charges-earned, only six complete and two partial expansions)
and seven contractions. Information was available on less than five issues for
utilities before 1905 and for industrials before 1910. The indexes for utilities
and for the combination of utilities and industrials are therefore based on
nine complete and one partial expansion and on ten contractions, and the
indexes for industrials on seven complete and one partial expansion and on
eight contractions.
The conformity indexes for the ratios of net income to gross
income preceding offering indicate erratic conformity to business
cycles, but the chart suggests a more systematic pattern. The ex-
planation is that the conformity indexes of the table were con-
structed on the assumption of coincident timing with business
cycles. Analysis of the timing of the turning points of these series
reveals that the ratio of net income to gross income for each indus-
try group except railroads typically expanded from mid-expansionEARNINGS COVERAGE 411
of the general business cycle (stage in) through the following
trough (stage Ix), and contracted during early business expansions
(stages i—ui). The conformity indexes on the revised basis are: for
all industries, —75 for expansions, —43 for contractions, and —85
for the full cycle; for public utilities and industrials combined,
—80, —20, and —68; for public utilities alone, —60, —20, and
—47; and for industrials alone, —50, —25, and —47. It is signifi-
cant that the corresponding ratios for all reporting business
corporations, calculated from data in Statistics of Income, show
negligible conformity to business cycles on the same timing basis.°
Since business contractions in the United States have usually
been short-lived, annual data do not permit accurate determina-
tion of the timing of turning points during contraction phases of
the cycle. We can, however, feel more confident about the behavior
of the annual series during expansion phases. The ratios of net
income to gross income typically reached troughs and began to
rise in advance of the upper turning point of business generally.
It is well known that common stock prices have usually turned
downward before general business, indicating greater caution on
the part of investors toward the close of expansion phases of the
cycle. The evidence suggests that this may have been true of bond
investors as well, since the margin of safety required on new
flotations turned upward before business generally began to slide.
The two earnings ratios thus provide some indication of the
existence of a perverse credit cycle in corporate bond financing, a
finding that supports the conclusions of earlier chapters. Gen-
erally speaking, lower investment standards appear to have pre-
vailed in good times than in bad. Whether this was caused by the
same investors varying their standards or by different investors
entering or leaving the market in expansions and contractions,
the effect was to make it more difficult for marginal borrowers to
obtain funds through the corporate bond market when business
was contracting than when it was beginning to expand. It is re-
markable that despite this finding, the total volume of funds
flowing through the corporate bond market from lenders to bor-
rowers exhibits an inverted pattern (cf. Chapter 4 of Volume of
Financing). That is to say, more funds were obtained through the
bond market during business contractions than during expan-
9Seefootnote 7 for the conformity indexes constructed on the bases of co-
incident timing. On a c—inbasis the indexes are .—iOO for expansions, 0 for
contractions, and —43 for the full cycle.412 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
sions, despite the fact that investors may have raised their stand-
ards in contraction phases of the cycle and lowered them during
early business expansions. Perhaps, better-than-average risks en-
tered the bond market in business contractions and turned to the
stock market or other sources for funds during business expan-
sions, a conjecture consistent with a hypothesis advanced in the
first report of this series concerning cyclical shifts in the demand
for capital funds (Volume of Financing, Chapter 4).
Default Rates
The theory behind the use of financial ratios by investors who
purchase at offering is that the ratios provide an index to the risk
of future default. After suitable allowance is made for the sta-
bility of earnings and the growth prospects of particular bor-
rowers, the larger the number of times fixed charges are earned
before offering, and the higher the ratio of net income to gross
income, the greater is the protection afforded by earnings, and
the lower should be the subsequent rate of default.
Evidence on this matter is presented in Tables 84 and 85, which
show the proportions of the par-amount totals of bond offerings
that subsequently went into default, classified by the two earnings
ratios at offering. A glance at the tables indicates that the ratios
stand up well under empirical testing. For all large and for all
small issues, the proportions of the par-amount totals of offerings
subsequently going into default were systematically lower the
higher the ratio of earnings to fixed charges; and the same was
true of the major industry components, except for street railways
and industrials. The default rates do not appear to be quite so
systematically related to the ratio of net income to gross income
at offering (note particularly the utilities and industrials), but
for all issues combined, they, too, decline as the ratio improves.
The relatively poor results for industrials may be due to the
greater heterogeneity of that group than of rails and utilities, or
perhaps to the greater volatility of industrial earnings.
The default rates were influenced as much by the industry of
the obligor as by the financial ratios at offering. For example, the
record for the large issues (Statistical Measures, Table 195) indi-
cates that a times-charges-earned ratio of 1.5, if set by a hypotheti-
cal investor as the limit below which he would not go when pur-
chasing bonds at offering, would have excluded 71 percent of the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































defaults (exduding street railways), but only 32 percent of indus-
trial defaults. Similarly, a ratio of twice fixed charges or better at
offering would have excluded 94 percent of rail defaults and 99.7
percent of utility defaults, but only 49 percent of industrial de-
faults.
It is thus clear that to have attained an equal degree of expo-
sure to default risk within each industry group for the large issues,
it would have been necessary to set higher standards for rails than
for utilities, and still higher standards for industrials. Because of
the tremendous growth potential of the utility industry (exclusive
of street railways), only 0.7 percent of the par-amount total of the
offerings of that group with fixed charges earned at least once
went into default during the period studied (4.1 percent in terms
of number of issues). To obtain similarly low default rates in
other industry groups, it would have been necessary for the in-
vestor to restrict purchases to rail issues on which charges were
earned approximately three times preceding offering, and to in-
dustrial issues on which charges were earned approximately four
times. It should be noted that in one edition of their text Benjamin
Graham and David L. Dodd suggest a minimum coverage of one
and three-quarter times fixed charges for utilities, two times fixed
charges for railroads, and three times fixed charges for indus-
trials.bo In our records the times-charges-earned ratios are classi-
fied by intervals of one-half percent. The ratios indicate that the
default rate on large utilities (including street railways) earning
charges one and one-half times or more at offering was 2.5 percent
in terms of par amount and 6 percent in terms of number of
issues. Similar default rates occurred for rails earning charges at
least two and one-half to three times, and for industrials earning
charges at least three to four times.
The relationship between earnings ratios preceding offering
and default experience afterward may be examined in greater
detail by means of the cross-classifications of default rates pre-
sented in Table 86. To facilitate statistical testing, the default
rates of this table are based on the number of offerings rather than
on the par amounts. Because of the sparsity of data for small
issues, only large issues are included.
10SecurityAnalysis, 1940 edition, p. 128. The minimum coverages given by
Graham and Dodd are presumably after-tax ratios comparable to those used
in this report. In a later edition of their text they recommend much higher
pretax ratios.416 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSiTION
TABLE 86—Proportions of Number of Offerings 1900—1943 in
Given Times-Charges-Earned Ratio and Ratio of Net
Income to Gross Income Classes at Offering That Went
into Default before 1944, with Number of Offerings in
Each Class















Large Issues, All Industries
Large, Railroads




































































































































Number of Offerings, Defaults and Nondefaults
Large Issues, All Industries
Under1.0 174 107 85 52 46 464
1.0—1.4 105 259 245 175 151 935
1.5—1.9 8 70 187 212 204 681
2.0—2.9 14 42 85 163 289 593
3.0 and over 17 82 74 77 218 468
TOTAL 318 560 676 679 908 3,141
Large, Railroads
Under 1.0 109 72 26 3 7 217
1.0—1.4 70 190 113 41 16 430
1.5—1.9 1 37 77 87 50 252
2.0—2.9 1 3 20 53 66 143
3.0 and over 0 0 2 11 34 47
TOTAL 181 302 238 195 173 1,089
Large,Public Utilities
Under1.0 27 35 59 ..49 38 208
1.0—1.4 23 66 131 133 134 487
1.5—1.9 2 15 106 124 154 401
2.0—2.9 0 6 52 105 222 385
3.0 and over 0 3 24 52 165 244
TOTAL 52 125 372 463 713 1,725
Large,Industrials
Under1.0 38 0 0 0 1 39
1.0—1.4 12 3 1 1 1 18
1.5—1.9 5 18 4 1 0 28
2.0—2.9 13 33 13 5 1 65
3.0and over 17 79 48 14 19 177
TOTAL 85 133 66 21 22 327
Defaultrates are from special tabulations of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, and are based on offerings of all large (straight) corporate
issues as given in the second section of the table. For definition of times-
charges-earned ratio, see note to Table 81; of ratio of net income to gross
income, note to Table 82.
417418 EARNINGS COVERAGE LIEN POSITION
Examination of the default rates in the marginal rows and
columns of the table reveals the close inverse relationship between
each of the two earnings ratios and relative frequency of default.
For example, in the all-industries section of the table, the default
rate falls steadily from 42.9 percent for offerings on which fixed
charges were earned less than once to 3.4 percent for those on
which charges were earned three or more times. Similarly, the
default rate falls from 37.1 percent for offerings on which net in-
come was less than 4 percent of gross income to 11.0 percent for
those on which net income was 20 percent or more. It will be
observed that the inverse relationship is not quite so pronounced
or so regular for public utilities as for all industries combined,
especially in the net to gross ratio. For the heterogeneous and
less numerous industrial group, the relationship of the margin of
safety to the default rates was irregular and there is some evidence
that it may even have been perverse, at least in certain class in-
tervals.
Comparing default rates within columns (i.e. within given
net-to-gross income classes) reveals that there was a perceptible
tendency in each case for the default rate to fall as the times-
charges-earned ratio rose, indicating that the improvement in
performance was not simply the result of the joint, or correlated,
effect of the two earnings ratios.h1 Similarly, across given rows of
the table, the default rates tend to fall as the margin of safety im-
proves, but the associations are not so close as the corresponding
ones based on the times-charges-earned ratio at offering. The tend-
ency for one ratio to compensate for the other (i.e. to offset the
effect of holding the other ratio constant) was apparently greater
when the given, or fixed, ratio was low than when it was high. For
example, where charges were earned less than one and one-half
times in the five years before offering, the default rate fell from
41 percent to 28 percent as the margin of safety rose from under
10 percent to 10 percent and over. On the other hand, where
fixed charges were earned one and one-half times or more, the
default rates were 10 percent and 11 percent, respectively, for the
two margin-of-safety classes. Similarly, if the margin of safety was
under 10 percent in the five years before offering, the default rate
was 41 percent where fixed charges were earned less than one and
11 Cu-square tests based on the total number of offerings, and on both
defaults and nondefaults considered separately, indicate that the two earnings
ratios were positively correlated at offering.EARNINGS COVERAGE 419
one-half times, but dropped to 10 percent where charges were
earned one and one-half times or more. If the margin of safety
exceeded 10 percent, the default rate also declined (from 28 per-
cent to 11 percent for the two times-charges-earned classes), but
the decline was not so great as when the margin of safety was
lower.
To test whether these relationships were statistically significant,
"contingency" tables were constructed containing in each cell
the actual number of defaults and the "expected" number under
various alternative assumptions as to the bearing of earnings cov-
erage on default incidence. For example, it was assumed that the
underlying default rate for the population from which observa-
tions were drawn was the same throughout all cells of each sec-
tion of the table (21.4 percent for all industries, 40.8 percent for
rails, and so on). The tests revealed that hypothesis to be clearly
untenable for the two ratios considered jointly, from which we
infer that the ratios, when used together, were reliable indicators
of the subsequent rate of default. Other tests based on the same
hypothesis revealed that each ratio when considered separately
had a significant effect on subsequent default experience. That is
to say, the higher the ratio, in either case, the lower was the de-
fault rate, so that each of the ratios was a useful indicator of sub-
sequent default experience without regard to the level of the
other. Highly significant results were obtained in all cases except
for the industrial margin of safety. For industrial offerings, the
margin of safety was not significantly related to subsequent ex-
perience, possibly because of the heterogeneity of the group and
the small number of observations.
To determine whether one ratio compensated for the other
(i.e. reduced default risk at a given level of the other ratio), a
second set of tests was applied, first by assuming uniform default
rates within given times-charges-earned classes (estimated by using
the default rates from the marginal row totals of Table 86), and
then by assuming uniform default rates within given margin-of-
safety classes (those indicated by the column totals of Table 86).
Highly significant results were obtained when the times-charges-
earned ratio was applied to offerings within fixed margin-of-
safety classes (industrials were an exception when the margin of
safety was very low), but less systematic results were obtained for
the margin of safety applied within given times-charges-earned
classes. When the fixed charge coverage was moderately low420 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
(times-charges-earned ratios of 1.0 and under 1.5), the margin of
safety had a significant inverse effect on the default rate (except
for the industrial group, where the data were inadequate); but
when fixed charges were earned a greater number of times, the
margin of safety had little or no independent effect (except for
utilities). Also, for very weak offerings—those of obligors whose
fixed charges were not covered once at offering—the margin of
safety had no significant independent effect.'2
On the whole, the results of these tests indicate that the two
earnings ratios were useful predictors of default experience,
whether used jointly or separately. The times-charges-earned ratio
was also a useful predictor independently of the level of the mar-
12outlined above, standard chi-square tests based on the observed num-
ber of defaults were applied to the all-industries data and to each of the major
industry groups. The class intervals used were similar to those shown in
Table 86, but rearrangement was necessary in certain cases (particularly for
the industrials) to obtain a sufficient number of "expected" observations in
the cells.
The tests were of two basic types: (1) those in which a uniform default rate
was assumed for all cells of the table, and (2) those in which a uniform de-
fault rate was assumed throughout a given row or column. Symbolically, let
represent the probability of a default occurring in a cell located at the in-
tersection of the ith row and jth column of the table;the probability of a
default occurring in the ith row;the probability of a default in the jth
column; and p the over-all probability of a default (row and column un-
specified). Under the first set of tests, the following nul hypotheses were
tested:= p;= p; p(i = 1,2,. .., r; j_1,2,...,s).Thatis,
the tests were applied to the row totals, to the column totals, and to the en-
tire contingency table, on the assumption of a uniform probability of default
throughout the table. Since p was estimated from the data, only one degree
of freedom was lost under each test. The results were significant (P < 0.05)
in all cases except for the industrial ratio of net income to gross income
(0.10 <P <0.20) and were highly significant (P <0.01) in all cases other than
for industrials.
Under the second set of tests the nul hypotheses were as follows:=
= (i= 1, 2,...,r; j 1,2, -.., s), thetest being applied to each
of the rrows,to each of the scolumns,to the combination of the rrows,and
to the combination of the scolumns.Since theand wereestimated from
the marginal totals, one degree of freedom was lost for each row (column).
Since chi-square is additive, for the combined test for rows there were (S —1)
X rdegreesof freedom; similarly, for the combined test for columns there
were (r— 1)Xs degreesof freedom. For the times-charges-earned ratio
(with margin of safety held constant), the results were highly significant in all
cases (P < 0.01) except for. industrials, which were borderline cases (0.01 <
P < 0.06). For the margin of safety, the results were not significant for in-
dustrials; nor for rails, utilities, and all industries with fixed charges earned
less than once; nor for all industries and rails with fixed charges earned one
and one-half times or more; but they were highly significant in the remaining
cases.EARNINGS COVERAGE 421
gin of safety (i.e. within each margin-of-safety class), but the mar-
gin of safety was a useful independent predictor only for offerings
in the moderately low times-charges-earned class. The fact that
the default experience of corporate bonds was so closely related
to the two earnings ratios at offering, both for all industries com-
bined and for the major industry groups, appears remarkable in
view of the length of time that normally intervenes between the
date of offering and date of extinguishment and the large num-
ber of events that may occur in that interval to influence the abil-
ity of obligors to meet the fixed charges on their obligations.
Default Losses
The times-charges-earned ratio and the ratio of net income to
gross income are useful at offering in estimating the degree of ex-
posure to default risk, but we should not expect them to be too
closely related to the price and yield experience of bond issues
once they have gone into default. The evidence on this matter is
presented in Tables 87 and 88. As in other experience tables for
defaulted issues, the data are simple unweighted averages of prices
and yields. Since little information was available for the small
issues, they have been omitted from the tables.
Table 87, which contains prices at date of default, values of
future receipts discounted back to date of default at 3 percent and
at 6 percent, and yields realized from date of default to extinguish-
ment, each classified by the two earnings ratios at offering, sug-
gests that earnings coverage at offering had little influence on
bond prices at default. (Note, however, the comparatively high
prices where charges were earned three or more times before offer-
ing, and where net income was 25 percent or more of gross.) Since
the investment process is essentially a forward-looking one, there
was a slightly closer relationship between bond prices at default
and values of future receipts discounted back to date of default
at 3 and at 6 percent, but except in one instance (issues with net
incomes of 20 to 24 percent of gross) the market was overly con-
servative at default, pricing most issues well below receipts dis-
counted at 6 percent.
The upper section of Table 87 shows that payouts were highest
on defaulted issues that had been in the highest times-charges-
earned class preceding offering, so that the yields realized by in-
vestors who purchased such bonds at default and held them to
extinguishment were exceptionally attractive. The reason is the422 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
TABLE 87—Market Prices at Default, Discounted Values of
Receipts after Default, and Realized Yields after Default
for Bonds Classified by Times-Charges-Earned Ratio and
by Ratio of Net Income to Gross Income at Offering,
1900—1943
RECEIPTS
Number of DISCOUNTED AT
EARNINGS RATIOS Issues UsedAverage — RealizedYield,
for PricesPrice at 3 6 Defaultto
and ReceiptsDefault Percent Percent Extinguishment
Under 1.0
Times- Charges-Earned Ratio
62 49 66 58 17.9%
1.0—1.4 93 39 60 49 19.6
1.5—1.9 41 48 66 56 23.1
2.0—2.9 15 40 54 47 20.6
3.0 and over 12 51 88 80 40.8
Information lacking
or not computed 358 •42 63 53 19.4
. Ratio of Net Income to Gross Income
Negative 30 48 64 57 23.7
Under 10 percent 101 42 66 55 22,4
10—14 percent 51 47 70 59 19.5
15—19 percent 26 45 67 56 13.6
20—24 percent 16 45 51 44 14.2
25 percent and over 7 56 66 59 15,2
Information lacking
or not computed 350 41 62 52 19.9
Sample data for large straight issues from special tabulations of the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Receipts include liquidating values of securities
still outstanding on January 1, 1944 at prices prevailing in the first quarter
of that year. Prices, discounted values, and yields are unweighted averages.
Neither of the earnings ratios was computed for guaranteed issues, issues
of companies deriving their major income from rentals, or for railroads when
the requisite earnings statements reflected years of federal operation (19 18—20).
In both ratios income is averaged over five years preceding offering date. In
the computation of the times-charges-earned ratio, income after taxes but
before charges is related to fixed charges for the first full year following offering.
In the computation of the ratio of net income to gross income, net income is
after charges and taxes.
large proportion of industrial issues in the group (75 percent) and
the generally favorable experience record of large industrials from
default to extinguishment (Table 20). Industrials were more
evenly distributed among the margin-of-safety classes (lower sec-
tion of Table 87) and the all-industry yields realized from default
to extinguishment reacted in the opposite direction. Relative toEARNINGS COVERAGE 423
the discounted value of future payouts, market prices at default
were particularly low for issues with a low average margin of
safety near the date of offering, so that under this rating system
the yields realized by investors who purchased at default were
higher for the lower-grade issues. The same was found true of
issues with a low composite agency rating one year and five years
before default (Table 37). Except for industry differences, there-
TABLE 88—Yields and Loss Rates up to Default and over Life
Span of Issues Defaulting 1900—1943 Classified by Times-
Charges-Earned Ratio and by Ratio of Net Income to
Gross Income at Offering











1.0—1.4 89 7.5—2.8 10.3 2.8 4.7
1.5—1.9 39 4.8—0.1 4.9 2.7 2.1
2.0—2.9 14 5.6—0.9 6.5 1.5 4.1.
3.Oandover 11 5.7—6.2 11.9 3.5 2.2
Information lacking
or not computed 337 6.2—4.6 10.8 1.8 4.4
Negative 28
Ratio of Net Income to Gross Income
9.7 2.3 7.4 7.2 2.5
UnderlOpercent 96 5.7—3.5 9.2 2.3 3.4
10—l4percent 49 8.7 2.1 6.6 4.2 4.5
15—l9percent 25 5.0—2.5 7.5 2.2 2.8
20—24 percent 16 5.1—0.9 6.0 1.4 3.7
25 percent and over 6 5.6—2.2 7.8 0.8 4.8
Information lacking
or not computed 329 6.1—5.0 11 .1 1.6 4.5
Sample data for large straight issues from special tabulations of the National
Bureau of Economic Research. Yields and loss rates are unweighted averages.
For issues still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at
prices prevailing in the first quarter of that year. Neither of the earnings
ratios was computed for guaranteed issues? issues of companies deriving their
major income from rentals, or for railroads when requisite earnings statements
reflected years of federal operation (19 18—20). In both ratios income is averaged
over the five years preceding offering data. In the computation of the times-
charges-earned ratio, income after taxes but before charges is related to fixed
charges for the first full year following offering. In the computation of the
ratio of net income to gross income, net income is after charges and taxes.424 EARNiNGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
fore, it would appear that under most rating systems low-grade
issues had a more favorable experience record from default to ex-
tinguishment than high-grade issues.
Table 88, which contains promised yields of defaulted bonds
at offering and yields realized from offering to default and to ex-
tinguishment, again classified by the two earnings ratios at offer-
ing, generally confirms the evidence of Table 87. The offering
prices of issues with superior ratios of earnings to fixed charges
were higher than those of other issues, and their promised yields
were lower. Realized yields from offering to default show no sys-
tematic relationship to the number of times charges were earned,
possibly because of industry differences. Thus, the times-charges-
earned ratio, while a good predictor of the risk of default, was a
poor one of the yield experience on bond offerings that went into
default. As has been noted, the yields realized from default to
extinguishment were highest for offerings in the best grade (largely
because of the industrials), and these roughly offset the poor per-
formance of the same issues from offeringdefault. Except for
that one group, in which industrials predominate, the life-span
yields on defaulted bonds (those covering the period from offering
to extinguishment) were better for issues with the lower times-
charges-earned ratios at offering.
Similar patterns appear for defaulted issues classified by ratio
of net income to gross income. Yields promised at offering were
generally lower for the better issues, but the yields realized from
offering to default were irregular. Since in this case the realized
yields from default to extinguishment were systematically higher
the poorer the grade, the life-span yields of the weaker offerings
were higher. In fact, the life-span yields of issues classified by the
margin of safety near the date of offering were roughly propor-
tional to the yields promised at offering, so that the loss rates from
offering to extinguishment were virtually independent of the mar-
gin of safety. The comparable loss rates for the times-charges-earned
ratios were erratic, but were lower for the highest grade issues.
Average Life-span Yields and Loss Rates
(nonde faulted and defaulted issues combined)
Life-span yields and loss rates for all issues (defaults and nonde-
faults) classified by the two ratios calculated from earnings data
for the five years preceding offering are presented in Tables 89
and 90. The data in the tables are weighted averages, with parEARNINGS COVERAGE 425
amounts of offerings as weights, and cover all offerings in the
large and small issues samples for which the earnings ratios could
be computed (a relatively small proportion of the total, particu-
larly for bonds offered in the early part of the century; see Tables
81 and 82).
Both tables exhibit the usual tendency for promised yields at
offering to be inversely related to the quality of the issues. Ex-
ceptions to this rule are rare and can usually be explained by the
mixing together of offerings of different industries and types in
the averages, or by shifts in the level and structure of money rates
over the period studied. The underlying averages of the promised
yields for the major industries, presented in Statistical Measures,
bear this out. They exhibit greater regularity than the all-indus-
tries figures, for offerings generally and for offerings of a given
type in a given period, e.g. regular offerings since 1920.
A usual tendency also, we have found, is for realized yields from
offering to extinguishment to behave like the promised yields,
i.e. to be inversely related to the quality of bond issues at offer-
ing. With some irregularity the standard pattern appears again
in Table 89 for total offerings of both large and small issues, but
the opposite pattern appears for the large regular offerings classified
by the times-charges-earned ratio. An examination of the underly-
ing data for large regular offerings of the major industries indicates
that the rails were the only nonconforming group (realized yields of
utilities and industrials were inversely related to quality), but the
pattern was so pronounced for the rails, and they bulked so large in
the totals, that their behavior governs the all-industries averages.
The structure of the realized yields for the rail group was influenced
by the exceptionally high default rates on the large issues with low
earnings coverage at offering (cf. Table 84), and by the low
yields generally realized on defaulted issues (Table 13).
The story is about the same in Table 90, where the yields are
classified by the ratio of net income to gross income at offering,
except that in this case the realized yields for the regular offerings
tend to revert to the standard pattern (lower yields for higher
quality issues). The explanation is that a more pronounced in-
verse relationship obtains between life-span yields and quality for
utilities and industrials when classified by the margin of safety
than by the times-charges-earned ratio. Also, rail default rates
were not so closely correlated with the ratio of net income to gross






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.430 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LiEN POSITION
85), so that their average realized yields did not fall so precipi-
tously with quality.
The loss rates of Tables 89 and 90 again exhibit what we have
found to be the standard pattern, with larger capital loss generally
indicated for the lower grade issues. Although both promised and
realized yields are usually related inversely to quality, the in-
version is normally less pronounced for the realized yields (owing
to the higher default rates on low-quality issues), so that the loss
rates are typically related inversely to quality. The same is neces-
sarily true of the loss rates of Table 89, since the realized yields of
certain classes of offerings (i.e. the large regular offerings) were
less closely related to the times-charges-earned ratios than to other
measures of quality. In Table 90, on the other hand, the realized
yields are more regularly inverted, so that the loss rates exhibit
a less regular pattern. Nevertheless, the loss rates were usually
higher for the poorer quality issues.
Except for the rails, there is thus evidence that the life-span
promised yields, realized yields, and loss rates behaved similarly
when classified by the two earnings ratios at offering, and that they
conformed to the standard patterns observed in earlier chapters.
That is to say, promised yields, realized yields, and loss rates were
generally higher for the lower quality issues. Because of the rails, the
average realized yields for all regular offerings behaved atypically
when classified by the times-charges-earned ratio, but reverted to the
standard pattern (although rather weakly) when classified by the
margin of safety. Conversely, the loss rates conformed more closely
to the standard pattern when classified by the times-charges-earned
ratio at offering than by the margin of safety.
The implications of the historical record are thus fairly obvious.
The large investor who could stand the risks of default and of ad-
verse market fluctuations would not, as a rule, have gained by
sacrificing promised yield for an improvement in quality. On the
contrary, he would have done best by buying high-yielding reor-
ganization issues with very low earnings coverage. The small in-
vestor, however, would have been safer with issues on which fixed
charges were earned a substantial number of times (the appro-
priate coverage depending largely upon the industry). High-
quality issues not only had lower default rates than low-quality
issues, but the returns obtained on them usually exceeded the
yields promised at offering. As Table 89 indicates, for regular of-LIEN POSITION 431
ferings of the combined industries, and for total offerings of large
issues, the point at which the loss rate was zero occurred when
fixed charges were earned about one and one-half times. Capital
losses occurred when fixed charges were earned less than one and
one-half times, and capital gains when charges were earned a
•greater number of times.
It should be remembered, of course, in interpreting these re-
sults that our records are heavily weighted by the unfavorable
experience of the 1930's. Because corporate bonds have been vir-
tually default-free since 1944, the inverse relationship between
quality and realized yield observed in the data would obtain, a
fortiori, if the records were extended to cover all issues offered
and extinguished up to the present time (1956).
LIEN PosITIoN
The term "lien position" is used here as a shorthand expression
for a two-way classification of bond offerings: by the type of se-
curity underlying the issue (i.e. whether or not it was secured by
a lien on assets), and by the rank of the issue at offering in the
funded debt structure of the obligor. Type of security and rank of
issue become important in the event of a default—or at least so
we are told by the legal theorists who have molded a large part of
our investment law. In theory, the bondholders (or a trustee act-
ing in their behalf) have various rights in the event of a default.
These include (1) the right of entry (the right of the trustee to
take possession of the property securing the issue and to operate
it for the benefit of the bondholders), (2) the right to sell the prop-
erty without suit, and (3) the right to foreclose on the property
and to dispose of it under the supervision of the courts. In prac-
tice, most of these rights may prove to be of little consequence,
unless the liens running against the assets are extremely simple
(e.g. bonds or other evidences of indebtedness secured by a direct
lien on residential property). In the event of financial difficulties,
the courts usually appoint a receiver to operate the property for
the benefit of the various claimants (bondholders, general credi-
tors, and equity interests) until the relative strength of the claims
on assets (and earnings) can be determined. Nevertheless, experi-
ence teaches that the courts, when settling these claims, are not
blind to the theoretical structure of the liens, and therein lies the
merit of well-secured, prior-lien obligations in default situations.C'
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In the section that follows we shall measure the volume of the
different types of liens flowing onto the market and compare their
default and yield experience.
Nature of the Data
Our breakdowns by lien position Consist of a rearrangement of
data in the original corporate bond records that were initially
coded for tabulation in two ways: (1) by the type of security un-
derlying the issue at date of first offering, i.e. secured or unse-
cured, and if secured, by a mortgage on real property, by collateral
(stocks and bonds), by a leasehold (the right to occupy real prop-
erty under a rental agreement, usually running beyond the ma-
turity of the bond issue),'3by a combination of these types of
security; and (2) by the rank of the issue in the obligor's funded
debt at date of offering. Since a great deal of attention is given in
prospectuses and investment manuals to the lien position of bond
issues, the coverage of the data on this subject is virtually coni-
plete, full information on both type of security and rank at offer-
ing being obtained for 99.5 percent of the par amount of bonds
floated in the period studied.
A breakdown of offerings by "type of security" as given in the
original corporate bond records is presented in Statistical Meas-
ures. Since little difference was found in the behavior of the sev-
eral types of secured obligations, they have been grouped together
for the present report, so that the breakdown by security provision
is simply into unsecured and secured issues. Unsecured corporate
bond issues (debentures) accounted for about one-quarter of the
total volume of bonds offered during the period studied, and were
most important in the industrial field, where they accounted for
almost 50 percent. Pure mortgage bonds, or those secured solely
by a lien on real property, accounted for about one-third of the
total; and "other" secured issues, which were backed by collateral
13Duringthe period studied, no cases were found in which a leasehold was
the sole security behind the issue;it was always accompanied either by a
mortgage on real property, or by mortgage and collateral. Occasionally, under
a leasehold, the mortgage was placed only on improvements made by the lessee
(obligor) on the leased property (a pure leasehold mortgage). More often, the
security under the leasehold consisted of the rights and benefits enjoyed by the
lessee under the lease. For example, an entire railroad system may have been.
pledged, including owned and leased lines and trackage rights, or the owned
property and mining leases of a steel corporation. A third type of leasehold
occurred mainly among small divisional rail lines, where the obligor (lessor)
pledged the lease as well as the property.LIEN POSITION 433
or leasehold security, or by combinations of such security with or
without additional mortgage security, accounted for the remaining
40 percent.
One of the things we should like to know is whether the ap-
praised value of the security behind a bond issue at offering bears
any relation to subsequent performance, a matter that unfortu-
nately Cannot be determined from the records since no informa-
tion was collected on value of security. (Estimation of such values
was too difficult a task for a mass statistical investigation.) The
records do, however, permit a comparison of the performance of
unsecured issues with those secured by direct or indirect liens on
physical assets. Our classification of issues as secured or unsecured
is roughly of this type. Debenture bonds that make up the unse-
cured group constitute residual claims on assets that rank equally
with the claims of the general creditors. Mortgage bonds are se-
cured by liens on physical assets ranking prior to debentures.
Bonds secured by both a leasehold and a mortgage are also se-
cured by physical assets, and have the additional protection of the
lease contract, the value of which depends partly on that of the
leasehold property if pledged, and partly on the credit standing of
the lessee or lessor. Bonds secured solely by collateral constitute
the principal difficulty in distinguishing between issues secured
by physical assets and by general creditors' claims, but in the ag-
gregate such issues were fairly unimportant, comprising only 15
percent of the par-amount total of bonds offered in the period
1900-1943. Moreover, the collateral behind the 15 percent was
frequently mortgage or leasehold bonds, which constitute a claim
on physical assets. Bonds secured solely by stock collateral have
some resemblance to debentures in that they are not backed by
specific liens on real property. On the other hand, the value of
the pledged stock not infrequently provides greater protection for
the bondholders than the specific pledge of physical assets, so that
there is justification for our treatment of such obligations as se-
cured issues. The basic records contain no breakdown of collateral
trust bonds by type of collateral security, but examination of some
of the larger issues indicates that those secured solely by common
stock were a rather small proportion of the total.
Within each of the two groups, secured and unsecured issues,
offerings were ranked for purposes of this report in order of the
priority of their claim on assets (see, for example, the caption of
Table 91). Since first mortgage bonds are senior to second mort-434 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
gage bonds, and second mortgage bonds are senior to third mort-
gage bonds or debentures, if an obligor had all three types of
obligations outstanding they were ranked as senior, intermediate,
and junior, respectively. If only two types were outstanding, they
were ranked as senior and junior; and if only one type, as senior.
The latter was the ranking assigiied when either first mortgage
bonds or debentures comprised the entire funded debt of the obli-
gor.
Because the project records did not note the value of the under-
lying security, all issues of the same obligor secured by first mort-
gages on distinct pieces of property were classified as senior liens,
even though some of them may have fared better in a corporate
reorganization than others. The rank of collateral trust issues was
determined from the character of the security behind them. For
example, a collateral trust issue secured by first mortgage bonds
having a face value at least as great as that of the issue under
which they were pledged was treated as a secured senior issue.
When a mortgage bond had a multiple lien on assets, e.g. part
first lien, part second lien, etc., the rank assigned was that of the
junior lien. An exception was made only when the amount of
physical property securing the junior lien aggregated less than 10
percent of that securing the senior lien. This question arose
mainly in the railroad field and was decided on the basis of the
length of line subject to the different liens.
In ranking the obligations of holding companies, attention was
given to the structure of liens in the entire corporate system. For
example, if subsidiaries had bonds or preferred stock outstand-
ing, issues of a holding company were classified as junior if they
were unsecured or secured solely by the common stock of subsidi-
aries. The capital structure of the parent company was disregarded
when ranking the obligations of its subsidiaries, a treatment con-
sistent with our use of financial statements in other sections of
the book when discussing earnings ratios and the asset size of
obligors. The financial statements used in such cases covered the
obligor and its subsidiaries but not the parent company. Through-
Out the analysis, equipment obligations were disregarded when
ranking issues at offering, as were bank loans and other obliga-
tions not normally considered part of the funded debt of the
corporation.
It will be observed that our procedure of ranking issues within
type-of-security class permits us to compare the behavior of issuesLIEN POSiTION 435
by rank independently of security provision and by security pro-
vision independently of rank, as well as by rank within security
class. The importance of the different major classes is indicated
by the fact that senior issues accounted for 52.4 percent of the par-
amount total of offerings in the period 1900—1943, intermediate
issues for 11.4 percent, and junior issues for 35.7 percent, with no
information available for the remaining 0.5 percent. The corres-
ponding proportions for the security-provision classes are: secured,
72.6 percent; unsecured, 26.9 percent; no information, 0.5 percent.
Security Provision, and Rank of Issue
in Obligor's Funded Debt, at Offering
Percentage distributions by lien position of the par-amount totals
of corporate bonds offered in the different quadrennial periods
are presented in Table 91. Since the information on lien position
is virtually complete, no adjustment has been made to eliminate
the few issues for which information could not be obtained. Like
the other statistics on bond characteristics examined in this report,
the data are universe estimates covering all straight corporate
bonds offered in the period 1900—1943. They were derived by ad-
justing annually the data for small issues within major industry
groups and combining with the data for large issues. The percent-
ages at the foot of each section of the table represent the propor-
tions of the par-amount totals of offerings in the full period
1900—1943 that fell in the indicated classes. Comparison of these
percentages with the corresponding percentages for the quadren-
nial periods helps to reveal trends in the lien position of offerings.
The all-industries figures of Table 91 indicate a trend away
from secured issues toward unsecured from 1900 through the late
twenties, accelerating toward the close of that period, as investors
became more optimistic about the outlook for debentures. A re-
verse trend, toward secured senior issues, is indicated in the de-
pressed thirties and early forties, when investors required the
additional security of adequate asset protection. As a result of
these offsetting changes, the proportion of secured senior offerings
(and of secured senior plus intermediate offerings) was approxi-
mately the same in 1940—43 as in 1900—1903; but the proportion
of secured junior offerings was much lower and the proportion of
debentures much higher.
Similar developments can be detected in the figures for the ma-
jor industry groups, but different features predominate in each436 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
case. For example, the pure first mortgage bond was rarely used
by the railroads during the period studied. Only 24 percent of the
par amount of rail bond offerings in the full period 1900—1943
represented secured issues of senior rank, as compared with 39
percent for industrials and 45 percent for utilities (Table 91). It
should be remembered in interpreting these figures that the rails
were already heavily indebted at the beginning of the period
studied, and few had unencumbered assets against which they
could issue additional senior liens. Instead, they issued blanket
mortgages, having a first lien on unencumbered parts of the sys-
tem, and a second or third lien on divisional lines (and hence
classified as intermediate or junior issues in most cases; see the
preceding section).
An explanation concerning earlier tables is pertinent here. Since
for many of the intermediate, multiple-lien issues the senior lien
afforded more protection to the bondholder than the intermedi-
ate or junior liens, or the senior lien became more important as
underlying divisional bonds were retired, and since multiple liens
bulked large in the total of intermediates, intermediate issues
were combined with secured senior issues to form the category
"senior liens" discussed in foregoing sections of the book on bond
characteristics; cf. Tables 29, 41, and 56. It is interesting that
the proportions of "senior liens" thus defined in the par-amount
totals of bonds offered were practically the same for rails (51 per-
cent) and for utilities (53 percent), but were lower for industrials
(only 42.5 percent).
The trend of secured senior rail issues was downward before
the Great Depression, but that of the senior and intermediate
groups combined was practically horizontal. After 1931, however,
investors gave more attention to the security behind their invest-
ments, and the volume of secured senior rail issues moved sharply
higher. The railroads offered a larger proportion of secured junior
issues than the other two industries over the full period studied
and over nine of the eleven constituent periods. On the other
hand, except for fairly mild and brief experiments with deben-
tures in 1904—15, and again in 1928—31, the railroads rarely used
the unsecured form of financing. It is significant that the periods
in which debentures were used by the rails were those in which
public confidence in the industry was high. Rail debentures in
most cases were junior to other issues, and were frequently pre-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































440 EARNiNGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
Up to 1916, first mortgage bonds were very important in the
public utility field because the financing in that period was mainly
by street railway and other operating companies. Thereafter, deb-
entures began to assume importance, in part because of the de-
cline of Street railway financing, and in part because of the rise
of pyramided holding companies in the electric light and power
field. The shift toward debentures reached its peak in 1928—3 1, at
the apex of the holding company movement. Debentures then
accounted for 46 percent, by volume, of all public utility offerings,
and senior and intermediate secured issues for 36 percent, in con-
trast to 0.5 percent and 59 percent, respectively, in 1900—1903. In
the thirties and early forties the proportion of senior and inter-
mediate secured offerings of the utility group moved back to the
1900 level, nearly doubling, while the proportion of debentures
declined by more than half.
In the main, the picture for industrials was unlike that of the
other major industry groups. Throughout the period studied there
was a gradual swing away from the secured types of industrial fi-
nancing toward debentures. Loss of confidence in 1932—35, it is
true, caused a return to secured senior issues, but it was short-
lived, as industrial debentures held up well under the stresses of
the thirties. The use of debentures by industrial corporations be-
gan early and persisted, and accounts in large part for the rise in
the share of debentures in the all-industries totals. Debentures
were first used by industrial corporations because of a rather
widespread belief that industrial plant and equipment did not
provide suitable security for a mortgage. Debenture financing
grew in popularity as it became evident that a lien is unnecessary
where earning power is adequate.
When presence or absence of a security provision is disregarded
and attention is focused solely on the rank of the issue (i.e. when
secured and unsecured issues are combined by rank), it appears
that the rails had a smaller proportion of senior, and of senior
plus intermediate, issues in the total of their offerings than either
of the other two groups, and a higher proportion of junior issues
(Table 91). For senior issues taken separately, that pattern pre-
vailed in all periods; for senior plus intermediate issues, it pre-
vailed in all periods except 1916—19 and 1924—35, when the rails
changed places with the utilities.
The rank pattern of industrial issues was opposite to that of
the rails, and the utilities held an intermediate position. BecauseLIEN POSITION 441
most of the industrial debentures had no issue ahead of them, the
industrials led both of the other major industry groups in the
proportions of senior issues and of senior plus intermediate issues
in the total of their offerings (when the secured and unsecured
issues are combined by rank). It follows that for the full period,
1900—1943, industrials as a class offered the smallest proportion of
junior issues (19 percent of the total, as compared with 38 per-
cent for utilities and 48 percent for railroads).
Security Provision and Business Cycles
Earlier it was noted that the share of unsecured obligations in
total bond offerings was relatively high in the buoyant twenties
and low in the depressed thirties. This observation raises the
question whether similar changes can be detected within the
shorter periods spanned by business cycles. Special annual series
were derived for this purpose (for the method of derivation, see
preceding sections on business cycles), and the results are pre-
sented in Charts 29 and 30 and Table 92. The various series
cover the par amounts of secured and unsecured offerings for each
major industry group, and the corresponding proportions of se-
cured offerings in total offerings (secured plus unsecured).
The data for rail offerings indicate that the asset protection un-
derlying them was systematically inverted with respect to the
general business cycle, the secured offerings conforming inversely,
and the unsecured offerings directly. Since it is known that the
total volume of rail offerings was typically inverted with respect
to general business during the period studied (cf. Volume of Fi-
nancing, Table 16), and since the secured offerings of railroads
were so important in that total, an inverted pattern was to be ex-
pected for secured rail offerings. It will be noted, however, that
the percents of total rail offerings that were secured, which may
be considered as independent of the inversion of the par-amount
totals on which they are based, were also inverted with respect to
general business (cf. Table 92), thus indicating that the inverted
pattern of the secured rail offerings was not simply a reflection of
the cyclical behavior of the total. The evidence provided by the
unsecured rail offerings is even more striking, since that series con-
forms positively to the general business cycle while the total con-
forms negatively.
The cyclical swings in secured rail offerings were so pro-
nounced, and the rails bulked so large in the all-industries figures442EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION









Universe estimates for straight bonds, yearly totals in par amount, from "StatisflcaI
Measures," Table 85. Secured issues are backed by mortgage, collateral, or lease-
hold.
Shaded areas, representing contractions in general business activity, and white areas,
representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's "Measur-
ing Business Cycles" (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946), p. 78.
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Based on universe estimates for straight bonds, yearly totals in par amount, from
"Statistical Measures," Table 85. Secured issues are backed by mortgage, collateral,
or leasehold.
Shaded areas, representing contractions in general business activity, and white areas,
representing expansions, are from Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell's "Measur-
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for secured offerings, that the latter series is also inverted with
respect to general business cycles. The rails were less important,
however, in the all-industries figures for unsecured offerings, and
that series shows negligible conformity with business cycles. No
visible conformity is indicated by the other conformity indexes
of Table 92, but these do not take account of possible leads or
lags at reference cycle turning points. An analysis of the timing
TABLE 92—Conformity Indexes for Secured Offerings, Un-
secured Offerings, and Percent of Total Offerings That
Were Secured, 1900—1943
Expansion Contraction Full Cycle
Secured Offerings
All industries —9 —80 —70
Railroads —60 —70
Public utilities +27 —20 +10
Industrials +27 +20 +30
. Unsecured Offerings
All industries +27 0 +1.0
Railroads +73 +40 +70
Public utilities +27 —40 —30
Industrials —18 —20 —10
Percent of Total Offerings
That Were Secured
All industries —64 0 —20
Railroads —80 —60 —80
Public utilities —27 +40 +20
Industrials —18 +20 —10
Based on annual par-amount data for straight corporate bonds from Ski-
Listical Measures, Table 85. These indexes do not take account of possible
leads or lags at reference-cycle turning points. They are based on ten complete
and one partial expansion and on ten contractions.
of the turning points of these series revealed several interesting
features, the most important of which is that secured industrial
offerings typically expanded from the trough of the general busi-
ness cycle to mid-expansion (stages i to III); and the conformity
indexes, when recomputed on that basis, show high positive con-
formity (+64 for expansions, +60 for contractions, and +70 for
the full cycle). The percents of total industrial offerings that were
secured typically expanded from the mid-contraction stage of the
business cycle to mid-expansion (stages vii to III); and conformity446 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
indexes constructed on that basis also show fairly high positive
conformity (+27, +60, +40). As was to be expected from the
high conformity indexes for rails in Table 92, both the secured
rail offerings and the percents of total rail offerings that were se-
cured usually expanded from peak to trough of the general busi-
ness cycle, while unsecured rail offerings expanded from trough
to peak. The other series—apart from the all-industries total of
secured offerings, which typically expanded over stages v to iii of
the cycle, and showed high negative conformity on that basis
(—60, —60, and —68)——had mixed timing patterns and negligible
conformity to business cycles.'4
It would appear from this evidence, and from general knowl-
edge of the psychology of the capital market, that investors have
usually looked upon secured rail issues as high grade and unse-
cured rail issues as low grade, while the selection has been the re-
verse for industrials. A factor contributing to this appraisal is that
the railroads were heavily indebted during most of the period
studied, so that rail debentures were typically junior to other
issues. Industrial corporations were not so heavily indebted as
the rails, and their debentures were usually not subordinated to
other issues. Industrial corporations with a good credit standing
have had little difficulty in floating debentures, and usually only
those with a low credit rating have been forced to offer investors
the additional protection of a lien on assets. The behavior of se-
cured and unsecured issues of railroad and industrial corpora-
tions over business cycles is thus consistent with our earlier con-
clusion that investors (and the investment rating agencies) have
been prone to upgrade bond issues in good times and downgrade
them in bad. In particular, investors were more willing to take rail
debentures and the secured issues of industrial corporations of low
credit standing when the business curve was rising than when it
was falling. An additional consideration, which is more valid for
rails than industrials, is that heavily indebted corporations fre-
quently seek to improve their balance sheet ratios by offering com-
mon and preferred stock and debentures when they are acceptable
l4An alternative expansion phase suggested by the analysis for unsecured
rail offerings was from stages i to iii of the general business cycle, but the con-
formity indexes constructed on that pattern are very similar to those pre-
sented in Table 92 +80, and The timing analysis also indicated
that unsecured public utility offerings frequently expanded over stages V to
ix, or possibly over stages v to iii; but no marked improvement in conformity
was shown when the indexes were recomputed accordingly.LIEN POSITiON 447
to the market, thus reserving their prior-lien securities for emer-
gency financing. Except for a brief and disastrous experiment with
debentures by the pyramided holding companies in the late twen-
ties, the public utility group was impervious to such swings in fi-
nancing. Bonds of the electric utility operatin.g companies, which
account for the major share of total utility financing, have usually
been well secured as to earnings and assets and have been generally
acceptable to investors throughout successive stages of the business
cycle. We cannot, of course, be sure that these conclusions are the
correct ones, but they are consistent with the available evidence
and with what is known about investor preferences.
Default Rates
The proportions of the par-amount totals of• corporate bond offer-
ings that subsequently went into default, classified by lien position
at offering, are presented in Table 93. As might be anticipated
from the fact that the lien position is designed to protect the bond-
holder in a default situation, rather than to reduce the risk of oc-
currence of a default, lien position at offering has had little direct
bearing on the incidence of default. The differences that appear in
Table 93 are related to the relative indebtedness and creditworthi-
ness of obligors in the different industry groups, and only indi-
rectly to the lien position of the issues at offering.
Within the secured group, for example, the default rates on
junior issues were about as low as (and in the majority of cases
were even slightly lower than) the default rates on senior issues.
The existence of a junior lien frequently indicates a top-heavy
debt structure, and investors are reluctant to purchase such issues
unless they are offered by corporations with better than average
credit standings. Secured issues of senior rank may also be offered
by corporations with high credit standing; but they are offered
by poorer risks as well, the prior lien being a kind of insurance
against the large losses that might otherwise occur in a default
situation. These various factors about cancel Outthe all-indus-
tries aggregates, so that no pronounced differences appear among
the default rates of senior and junior liens.
It will be noted in Table 93 that the large intermediate rail
liens had much higher default rates than other secured rail issues.
In the railroad field, the intermediate liens (issues senior to some
but junior to others) were frequently offered by large, heavily






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































precisely those roads that defaulted on their obligations. A similar
situation occurred in the street railway group, in this case for
small as well as large issues. In financial structure many of the
street railways were like the railroads, an intermediate lien being
frequently a sign of a complex and top-heavy debt structure.
Analogous results are to be observed within the unsecured
group, where the junior issues had higher default rates than senior
issues (note, however, the exceptional behavior of the rails). Not
infrequently, a junior unsecured issue, like an intermediate se-
cured issue, indicates a complex capital structure and is a mark
of financial weakness. It is interesting, however, that when the
secured and unsecured issues are combined and the default rates
are recalculated by rank of issue, the differences between junior
and senior issues largely disappear. As has already been noted, the
intermediate issues(all of which were, by definition, secured
issues) had somewhat higher default rates than other issues.
Comparison of the default rates on secured and unsecured
issues (Table 93) reveals that the debentures usually fared better
than other issues. Railroads, street railways, and industrials had
lower default rates on unsecured offerings than on any of the se-
cured classes except intermediate issues among large industrials
and small rails. Public utilities other than street railways, how-
ever, had higher default rates for unsecured than for secured issues
(except senior issues among small utilities). The explanation is
similar to that offered above concerning the favorable default
record of the junior issues within the secured group. Except in the
most buoyant times, only corporations with good credit standing
(large earnings coverage, etc.) were able to float debentures suc-
cessfully, and the securities of such obligors usually had an ex-
cellent default record, regardless of security provision. In periods
of excessive optimism, however, weaker corporations with no
mortgageable assets were occasionally able to float debentures
successfully. Most of the utility debentures, for example, were
offered by the large pyramided holding companies that mush-
roomed in the late twenties. The obligors were usually high-
leverage corporations with no mortgageable assets and only the
most tenuous claim on the earnings of the underlying operating
utilities. As the high default rates for the large unsecured utility
issues indicate, many of the holding company debentures went
into default when utility earnings contracted in the thirties.
On the whole, the evidence of the default rates for the unse-450 EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
cured issues lends support to a view frequently expressed by
earlier financial writers to the effect that debentures may be
offered by very strong or very weak corporations, but that they
are seldom offered by middle-of-the-road corporations.15 The type
of security offered investors by prospective borrowers, the rank
of the obligation in the funded debt structure, etc., must be
tailored to meet the requirements of investors at the time of offer-
ing. During most of the period covered by our records, only the
strongest corporations—those with the highest earnings ratios and
the most conservative capital structures—were able to satisfy bond
investors with debentures. Occasionally, however, investor re-
quirements were more easily met, even by the weakest of deben-
tures. The essential point is that the default experience of the
different types of issues is a reflection of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the corporations that floated them, and that these mat-
ters are related only in a roundabout way to the type of security
offered. In short, there is little evidence from the default rates of
Table 93 that lien position at offering, when considered inde-
pendently of industry, earnings coverage, capital structure, etc.,
had a significant effect on the frequency with which corporate
bonds went into default.
More detailed data on this matter are presented in Tables 94
and 95, which contain default rates for large issues based on the
number of offerings in the different lien-position classes, and the
corresponding number totals, cross-classified by the two earnings
ratios at offering. (Because information-lacking entries are omitted,
the number totals of the tables do not agree.) For all industries
combined, the default rates were higher for total secured issues
than for total unsecured, and the differences persisted with fair
regularity throughout the different earnings classes. More pro-
nounced differences appear within the two groups because of the
high default rates for intermediate secured issues and for junior
unsecured issues; and these differences also persist throughout
most of the different earnings classes.
Again the data for major industries illuminate the all-industries
totals. Clearly, the heavy incidence of default on intermediate rail
bonds and on junior utility debentures (primarily issues of the
See,for example, William Z. Ripley's remarks on this point in his Rail-
roads, Finance and Organization (New York, 1915), pp. 142 f.; also Arthur Stone
Dewing's more cautious statement in A Study of Corporation Securities (New









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































pyramided holding companies) are the main factors. Within the
respective earnings-coverage classes, the default rates for secured
rail issues did not differ significantly from one another, but the
high default rate for rails generally, and the dominant position of
the rails in the total of all intermediate issues, raised the default
rates for total intermediates above those of other secured issues.
For the utility group, the default rates classified by lien position
showed significant variation, primarily because of the heavy de-
faults on the junior debentures of the pyramided holding com-
panies. The cause, however, was not lien position per Se, but the
fact that fixed charge coverage was too low on these high-leverage
obligations. For the industrial and rail groups, on the other hand,
debentures had a much better record than secured issues. Indus-
trial debentures comprised a sufficiently large part of all deben-
tures to bring the default rates on total unsecured issues below
those on the secured issues. Among issues of public utilities whose
ratio of net income to gross income was less than 15 percent, the
higher default rates for secured than for unsecured offerings were
largely the result of defaults on secured intermediate street rail-
way issues. On the whole it appears that the differences observed
in the default rates for the different lien-position classes reflected
largely industry differences in risk and in the rank and type of
issue offered by the respective industries.16
Default Losses
Earlier in the chapter, earnings coverage at offering was found to
be systematically related to the rate of subsequent default but not
to the experience on bonds after default. The question now is
whether or not price and yield experience after default is related
to the lien position of an issue at offering. To the extent that the
lien position actually performs its expected function in the invest-
ment process, secured issues should fare better after default than
debentures and junior liens. Evidence on this matter is presented
16Chi-squaretests similar to those discussed in note 12 were applied by
converting the default rates of Tables 94 and 95 into numbers of defaulted
issues, and combining where necessary to obtain a sufficiently large number
of observations. The hypothesis tested was that of constancy of default rates
within rows of the tables (i.e., a constant default rate,= for each
earnings.coverage class). Significant results were obtained consistently for the
combined industries and for utilities, but not for rails or industrials. Tests
for differences in default rates classified by the two earnings ratios within
given lien-position classes = yieldedsignificant results in virtually
all cases.460EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITiON
in Tables 96 and 97, which contain price averages for defaulted
issues at date of default, values of receipts after default discounted
at 3 percent and at 6 percent, and realized yields over significant
periods in the life span of defaulted issues, each classified by lien
position at offering. As in other tables of this type, the data are
simple unweighted averages, and are presented separately for de-
faulted issues in the large and small issues samples.
TABLE 96—Market Prices at Default, Discounted Values of
Receipts after Default, and Realized Yields after Default
for Bonds Classified by Lien Position at Offering, 1900—
1943
RECEIPTS
Number of DISCOUNTED AT











43 63 53 20.0%
Secured issues 453 44 66 55 18.2
Senior 228 45 67 56 17.4
Intermediate 89 43 62 51 18.4
Junior 136 45 66 55 19.4
Unsecured issues 125 35 55 48 26.6
Senior 52 39 61 53 30.0
Junior 73 33 52 44 24.2
Information lacking 3 58 62 49 11.2
All issues 137
Small Issues
40 63 54 26,7
Secured issues 124 39 64 55 27,0
Senior 95 40 64 55 25.5
Intermediate 6 56 88 75 18.5
Junior 23 32 58 50 35.4
Unsecured issues 13 44 55 48 24.2
Senior 9 47 57 50 19.3
Junior 4 37 50 44 35.2
Information lacking 0
From Table 226 of Statistical Measures, coveringissues in the default
experiencesample. Prices, discounted values, and yields are unweighted
averages. Receipts include liquidating values of securities still outstanding on
January 1, 1944 at prices prevailing in the first quarter of that year. The
term "senior" is inclusive of issues neither senior nor junior to other issues;
i.e., constituting the obligor's entire funded debt. Intermediate issues are
junior to some issues and senior to others. Secured issues are backed by
mortgage, collateral, or leasehold.LIEN POSITION 461
Concerning large issues, Table 96 indicates that for the group
of secured issues that defaulted, there were no pronounced dif-
ferences among issues of different rank, either in the average
market prices at default, in receipts discounted back to date of
default at 3 percent and at 6 percent, or in yields realized by in-
vestors who purchased at default and held to extinguishment.
Unsecured large issues showed a pronounced price weakness at
default, with the junior issues having the poorest record in that
size group. Discounted values of future receipts were also lower
at default for unsecured than for secured large issues, but not so
low as the market prices at default, so that investors who pur-
chased at default and held to extinguishment obtained higher
returns on the debentures. An industry breakdown of the data
(not presented in Table 96) shows that the price weakness of the
debenture group at default was caused primarily by the large pub-
lic utility issues (forty-five in number), 87 percent of which were
obligations of pyramided holding companies. While the average
price at default for large utility debentures was only 26 compared
to 51 for secured issues of the same group, among rails the deben-
tures were priced almost as high as the secured issues (42 as against
44), and among industrials the debentures were priced even higher
(41 against 36). Likewise, the discounted values of receipts were
much higher for secured issues than for unsecured issues in the
large public utility group; for large rails and industrials the dif-
ferences were also in favor of the secured issues but were not so
great. Virtually the same industry differences prevailed within
the sample of small defaulted issues, but since only two small pub-
lic utility debentures in the sample defaulted, they did not distort
the general picture to the same extent.
The statistics of Table 96 therefore indicate that the payouts
on unsecured issues after default were on the average not so large
as on secured issues, and that the prices on the large unsecured
issues were particularly low at date of default, the debentures of
the pyramided public utility holding companies being the worst
offenders in both respects. On the other hand, prices generally
were so low at default that with most types and ranks of issues an
investor purchasing at default could obtain extremely high re-
turns if the bonds were held to extinguishment.
Further evidence to the same effect is presented in Table 97 in
the form of average promised yields on defaulted issues at date
of first offering (the principal offering for most issues), and average462EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
realized yields and loss rates calculated from dates of first offering
to default and first offering to extinguishment.
For virtuallyalllien-position classes, negative yields were
realized on issues sold at default (and heavy losses were incurred),
TABLE 97—Yields and Loss Rates up to Default and over
Life Span of Issues Defaulting 1900—1943 Classified by
Lien Position at Offering
















Secured issues 428 6.1 —1.9 8.0 2.8 3.3
Senior 212 6.2 —3.6 9.8 2.3 3.9
Intermediate 87 5.6 —0.2 5.8 2.5 3.1
Junior 129 6.2 —0.2 6.4 3.6 2.6
Unsecured issues 119 7.4 —9.2 16.6 0.6 6.8
Senior 51 7.0—10.6 17.6 0.4 6.6
Junior 68 7.7 —8.2 15.9 0.8 6.9
Information lacking 2 3.6 2.4 1 .2 2.9 0. 7
Small Issues
Allissues 119 7.8 —4.0 11.8 2.4 5.4
Secured issues 107 7.6 —3.911.5 2.7 4.9
Senior 86 7.8 —3.0 10.8 3.0 4.8
Intermediate 4 5.5 0.7 4.8 3.2 2.3
Junior 17 7.0 —9.5 16.5 1.0 6.0
Unsecured issues 12 9.7 —5.0 14.7 0.6 9.1
Senior 8 11.4 —2.7 .14.1 1.6 9.8
Junior 4 6.4 —9.5 15.9—1.5 7.9
Information lacking 0
From Table 225 of Statistical Measures, covering issues in the default
experience sample. Yields and loss rates are unweighted averages. For issues
still outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at prices prevailing
in the first quarter of that year. The term "senior" is inclusive of issues neither
senior nor junior to other issues; i.e., constituting the obligor's entire funded
debt. Intermediate issues are junior to some issues and senior to others.
Secured issues are backed by mortgage, collateral, or leasehold.
but the experience on the secured issues was not so poor as on
the debentures. For the large issues the average yield realized
from first offering to default was —1.9 percent for secured issues,
and —9.2 percent for unsecured; and for the corresponding classes
of small issues, —3.9 percent and —5.0 percent. The heavy lossesLIEN POSITION 468
on the large debentures were caused partly by the price weakness
of the utilities at date of default and partly by the short period
for which several of the industrial debentures were outstanding
before they went into default. Large senior secured issues had
poorer records than the intermediates and juniors when sold at
default. Among small issues, however, senior secured issues fared
better than junior.
Somewhat more telling evidence against the defaulted deben-
tures is provided by the life-span yields (i.e. yields from first offer-
ing to extinguishment), since such yields are unaffected by the
particular prices that happened to prevail at date of default. Ex-
cept for small junior liens, the life-span yields on the secured
issues were similar for the different groups, and were uniformly
higher than on the debentures. The average life-span yield on
debentures that defaulted (large and small issues) was only 0.6
percent, less than one-quarter of the yield obtained on the secured
issues that defaulted. Moreover, since the average yield promised
was higher for the debentures than for the secured issues, and
since the average yield realized was lower, the difference (the loss
rate) was much higher for the unsecured issues (about twice as
high, on the average, for both the large and small issues). The
breakdowns of the secured and unsecured defaulting issues by
rank of issue reveal surprisingly small differences among life-span
yields and loss rates, particularly in view of the small number of
issues included in several of the classes. The similarity of the
averages within the secured and unsecured groups tends to sub-
stantiate the striking differences observed between the over-all
averages of the two classes of defaulted issues.
The underlying industry breakdowns for large issues (Tables
225 and 226 in Statistical Measures) provide additional evidence
that secured issues generally fared better than unsecured in de-
fault situations. Rail debentures were exceptional among defaults
in that they had higher life-span yields than secured rail issues
(4.6 percent versus 3.1 percent), but this was caused by the much
higher yields promised on the rail debentures at offering (10.7
percent versus 5.8 percent for the secured issues) and not by
superior performance after default: the value of receipts there-
after discounted at 3 percent was only 58 for rail debentures, as
against 64 for the corresponding group of secured issues. For de-
faulted large issues in the other major industry groups, life-span
yields realized on secured bonds were better than on unsecured464EARNINGS COVERAGE AND LIEN POSITION
(2.9 percent for secured utility issues and —1.5 percent for un-
secured; 1.8 percent for secured industrial issues and 0.9 percent
for unsecured). These differences are largely explained by the
higher payouts on the secured issues after default. For large utility
issues, the average value of receipts after default discounted at
3 percent was 70 for the secured issues and only 47 for the unse-
cured (mostly, issues of the pyramided holding companies). For
large industrials, the corresponding discounted values were 63 for
secured issues, and 61 for unsecured issues.
The evidence thus leaves little room for doubt that secured
issues worked Out better in default situations than unsecured
issues. For the combined industries the average yields realized on
defaulted issues if held from offering to extinguishment were posi-
tive for each of the different lien-position classes except the un-
secured small issues of junior rank, but were much lower for unse-
cured than for secured issues. In each size-industry class other
than small rails, unsecured issues had a poorer record than
secured issues with respect to cash payouts after default, and their
life-span yields were lower in all classes except large rails. Sub-
classes by rank of issue within unsecured and secured obligations
that defaulted show further differences in average performance,
but with no consistent pattern from group to group.
Average Life-span Yields and Loss Rates
(nondefaulted and defaulted issues combined)
Thus far we have found that while unsecured issues in most in-
dustry-size classes had lower default rates than secured issues, the
unsecured issues usually had poorer yield records after default.
This leaves unresolved the question of how these two factors—
which affected oppositely the two types of issues—were combined
in the over-all results. The evidence on this matter is summarized
in Table 98 in the form of weighted average promised yields,
realized yields, and loss rates covering defaulted plus nonde-
faulted issues.
In the sample of large issues, the yields promised on the se-
cured and unsecured issues at offering were quite similar, but the
underlying industry breakdowns (Tables 199 and 200 in Statistical
Measures) show a mixed pattern. For all regular offerings, and
for regular offerings since 1920, the yields promised on utility
debentures were higher than on secured issues; but the reverse
was true for large rails and industrials. The differences amongLIEN POSITiON 465
realized yields on secured and unsecured issues were small for
large issues of the combined industries, but were more pronounced
within major industry groups and were in favor of the secured
issues in eleven out of twelve comparisons of the averages.'7 The
industry differences are not fully reflected in the all-industries
averages of Table 98, since the life-span yields realized on indus-
trials (both secured and unsecured) were much higher than on
other issues, and the industrials accounted for almost half of the
par-amount total of unsecured offerings of large issues. Within
major industry groups, the capital loss rates from offering to ex-
tinguishment for large issues were also generally higher (or capital
gain rates lower) on unsecured than on secured offerings, the dif-
ferences in this respect being reflected more or less faithfully in
the all-industries average of the table.'8 The evidence therefore
indicates that the over-all yield performance of the unsecured large
issues was generally inferior to that of the secured issues. The
higher yields promised on some of the large debentures at offering
and the lower default rates on them were more than counter-
balanced in the period studied by the poorer yields realized on
debentures that went into default.
The reverse pattern held for small issues (Table 98). While the
yields promised at offering were not greatly different as between
secured and unsecured issues, the life-span realized yields were
considerably higher on the unsecured issues, and the loss rates
were considerably lower; and these patterns were repeated with
great regularity within the major industries.'9 The reason for this
17 The twelve comparisons were for total offerings, regular offerings, and
regular offerings since 1920, each subclassified into four industry groups: rail-
roads, street railways, other public utilities, and industrials. In the twelfth
comparison (regular industrial offerings since 1920), the averages for secured
and unsecured issues were equal.
18 For the twelve classes of issues mentioned in footnote 17, the average loss
rates were higher for unsecured than for secured large issues in nine com-
parisons (all except the three for industrials). The industrials differed from
the other industry groups in that the promised yields for the three groups
compared were consistently lower on unsecured than on secured issues. For
total offerings and all regular offerings of industrials, the realized yields of the
unsecured offerings were also lower, and by the same amount as the promised
yields, so that the loss rates for the secured and unsecured groups were equal.
For regular industrial offerings since 1920, the realized yields on secured and
unsecured large issues were equal, so that the loss rate was lower for the un-
secured issues.
19 Within each of the twelve groups mentioned in footnote 17 the average
yield realized was higher for unsecured than for secured small issues. The
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reversal of pattern is revealed by the default rates of Table 93.
The lower yields realized on the secured small issues held from
offering to extinguishment, and the higher losses suffered, reflect
the high rate at which they went into default. Actually, as Table
97 shows, average life-span yields on defaulted debentures (both
small issues and large) were poorer than on secured issues; but
the default rate was sufficiently low on the small debentures to
offset the adverse effect on the over-all yield. It appears that small
debentures were floated by obligors with better than average
credit standings, and once floated, went into default infrequently.
Conversely, secured small issues were frequently offered by obli-
gors with a lower than average credit standing, and these went
into default more frequently. As it worked out, for small issues the
credit rating of the obligor was more important than the security,
so that the average realized yield was higher on debentures than
on other issues. With large issues, however, the reverse was true:
the default rate of the debentures was not so low (relative to that
on secured issues) as to offset the lack of security, and they fared
worse, on the average, than other issues.
Turning briefly to the ranks of the obligations within the se-
cured-issue group (Table 98), it appears that there was little dif-
ference in life-span yield performance between the senior and
junior liens. The intermediate liens, however, show an opposite
pattern for the realized yields of large and small issues. Inter-
mediate liens among large rails and street railways had excep-
tionally high default rates (cf. Table 93), which lowered the aver-
age realized yield for the combined industries. Conversely, the
default rates on intermediate liens among small rails and small
utilities other than street railways (which together accounted for
82 percent of the intermediate liens among small issues) were quite
low, and this raised the average realized yield for the combined
industries.
It appears, in conclusion, that the salvage value on defaulted
debentures was generally lower than on defaulted secured issues,
so that the average life-span yield realized on defaulted debentures
was generally lower. This factor worked against the debentures in
every group studied. Where the default rate on the debentures was
high (e.g. large rails and street railways), the over-all yield realized
were higher) in ten of the twelve comparisons, were equal once, and were
higher once.LIEN POSITION 469
on debentures—nondefaulting and defaulting issues combined—
was below that on secured issues. But where the default rate on
the debentures was low (e.g. the small issues generally), the over-
all yield realized was high. There is nothing in the records to
indicate, however, that the default rate was significantly affected
by the security provision or the rank of the obligation at offering,
when considered independently of the creditworthiness of the
issuer.
The chief implication of this chapter is that proper attention
to the protection afforded by assets and earnings is generally
rewarded by lower-than-average default rates and higher-than-
average yields realized on issues that suffer defaults. These are
the factors that are usually recommended by investment hand-
books for the attention of small investors. The evidence would
seem to indicate, however, that large institutional investors may
by proper selection substitute earnings coverage for lien position
to obtain a high average portfolio yield, but that such a procedure
would ordinarily be too hazardous for the small investor, who
must seek security of principal before giving attention to yield.
When purchasing debentures, the large investment institutions
regularly insist on full earnings protection, a practice that is
thoroughly justified by the experience record of the debentures
that went into default.